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CllAR.TER. OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
THE EXCLUSIORAllY KIJLE 
Regina v. Collins B. C. Court of Appeal February 1983 CA 821232 
R. v. Cohen B. C. Court of Appeal, CA. 821475 
Police off ice rs had some people in a pub under surveillance. Two of 
them left but the accused and others stayed. The persons who left 
were followed and after they had stopped at a trailer park the 
officers stopped their car and found balloons with heroin. 
The officers then returned to the pub and approached the accused. 
Although the arresting officer conceded that he had no grounds for 
believing that she had any drugs or narcotics on her he, because of 
being suspicious, grabbed the accused by the throat to prevent her 
from swallowing. The accused's mouth was clear but he saw subse-
quently that she clenched something in her hand. This turned out to 
be a balloon containing heroin. It was the admissibility of this 
heroin the accused disputed on the basis that the search was not one 
authorized by law as the officer did not have the reasonable and 
probable grounds prerequisite to a legal search. 
Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees us to be 
secure against unreasonable search while section 24(2) of that Charter 
states that evidence obtained by means that infringe on or deny 
anyone's rights or freedoms must be excluded. However, the subsection 
warns that when considering the admissibility of evidence so obtained, 
the judiciary must have regard to all circumstances and consider if 
the admission of evidence so obtained would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. This issue compelled the courts to give an 
interpretation of section 24(2) of the Charter and determine the 
degree of the 'exclusionary rule' it creates. This case was decided 
by the B. C. Court of Appeal and despite the fact that it is the high-
est court in our Province, its resolves may well be influential but 
are not binding on courts in other provinces. The Supreme Court of 
Canada may disagree with these views and its decisions, of course, are 
to be followed by all Canadian Courts. 
Perhaps the issues raised in the numerous courtroom debates respecting 
the exclusionary rule (also known as the poisonous tree principle) in 
the U.S. and Canada may .cfepict the dilemma of the judiciary. 
2 
The basic question is whether fruit of a known poisonous tree is fit 
and safe for consumption at the table of evidence. Will its presence 
disgrace the table? Will it shake the confidence of the guests to 
such a degree that they doubt the hygiene in the kitchen, question the 
competence of the chefs and fear contamination? 
The Bible tells us that no good fruit can grow on a poisonous tree. 
However, the Good Book also says that it is virtuous not to be waste-
ful with food. In the U. S. they apparently found the former text 
more compelling that the latter. In Canada we have been m:>re inclined 
to consider the poisonous tree text as a warning to be aware and care-
ful of the possibility of poisonous fruit. However, when the fruit 
was tested and found to be good then we, in Canada, used to comply 
with the prohibition to discard good food. However, quite separately 
from dealing with the harvested fruit, we subsequently paid some 
attention to the tree to cure it or to put the axe to it 
History of Exclusionary Rule: 
The United States Supreme Court established a strict exclusionary rule 
for the Federal Courts in 19141 and for the State Courts in 19612. 
After a number of warnings to law enforcement off ice rs and other 
government authorities, the U. S. Supreme Court felt it had to protect 
the public from oppressive enforcement, discipline agents of the State 
and doubt their credibility when they had used illegal or surrep-
titious means to collect evidence, particularly where this amounted to 
constitutional contempt. Furthermore, the Court had to protect and 
maintain its own image to not only be, but also appear to be, just and 
impartial. The judiciary are, afterall, the enforcers of the consti-
tution. By accepting evidence which was obtained by unauthorized and 
illegal means the Court would become a party to those means. 
Although on the surface, this is a commendable and apparent appropri-
ate position to take by the Courts, the consequences have in some 
cases deeply shocked public confidence in the judicial system. 
Wigmore, the authority on evidence, wrote the following to demonstrate 
the absurdidity of a strict exclusionary rule which he called 
"indirect and unnatural"3: 
"Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a 
lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated the 
Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for 
crime, and Flavius·for contempt. But no! We shall let 
you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly 
but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. " 
1 Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 
2 Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643. 
3 A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law 
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Wigmore obviously ridiculed the absurdity of erasing one person's 
wrong because someone else committed another wrong. Why should each 
not be responsible for his own acts? There is evidence that the U.S. 
find this exclusionary rule a legal luxury they can no longer afford 
and there is considerable activity to modify the strictness of their 
exclusionary rule. This, while Canada is getting into an exclusionary 
rule the degree of which is still uncertain. 
In Canada we had the start of an exclusionary rule in the first few 
"rounds" of the well known Wray case4. In a robbery, Wray had 
exchanged the life of a service station attendent for the $55 in the 
till. The murder was committed with a rifle which Wray threw in a 
lake or swamp afterwards. 
A statement obtained from Wray revealed the location of the rifle and 
a ballistics test proved that the retrieved rifle was the murder 
weapon. However, numerous improprieties occurred during the interview 
and the statement was ruled inadmissible in evidence. The Ontario 
trial Court as well as the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the 
exclusion of the statement included all evidence that was obtained as 
a result of the information Wray gave police in his statement. This, 
of course, included Wray's knowledge of the location of the rifle, the 
weapon itself and the results of the ballistics test. Without this 
evidence a conviction was simply not possible in the circumstances. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the decision. It held that, 
although the statement was inadmissible (the poisonous tree), the 
proven facts discovered as a result of it (the good fruit) were admis-
sible. This, the critics said, removed all inherent judicial discre-
tion to exclude evidence where the illegal means used to obtain it and 
the evidentiary value of the proven facts are disproportionate and an 
imbalance on the scales of justice. This judge-made-law remained 
unaltered until April 17 of 1982 when the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms became effective and, until this issue is again put to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, we will not be able to assess the impact of 
section 24 of that Charter. 
This Collins case is well suited to address all these issues and the 
B. c. Court of Appeal said, in view of section 24 of the Charter: 
"No longer is all evidence admissible, regardless of the 
means by which it was obtained. Nor on the other hand, 
is all improperly obtained evidence inadmissible. A 
middle ground has.been chosen, but not the middle ground 
of discretion that has been chosen in many jurisdic-
tions". 
4 R. v. Wray [1971] S.C.R. 272 
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This of course because the Charter stipulates that the Courts must 
have regard to all the circumstances, and if the admission of such 
illegally obtained evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute. The Court said: 
"But it is not open to a court in Canada to exclude evi-
dence to discipline the police. We are only to exclude 
evidence to avoid the administration of justice being 
brought into disrepute". (Emphasis is mine) 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that the accused must show that on the 
balance of probabilities his rights or freedoms were violated and 
that admission of the evidence obtained by means of such a violation 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Said the 
Court: 
"It is the admission, not the obtaining, that is the 
focus of attention, though the manner of obtaining the 
evidence is one of the circumstances". 
And later, after concluding that Canadian Courts are not badly 
regarded in spite of them having accepted illegally obtained evidence 
up until last year, the Court said: 
"The United States' experience teaches us that excluding 
illegally obtained evidence tends to bring the adminis-
tration of justice into disrepute, at least where there 
is not, on the part of the police, a contempt for consti-
tutional rights". 
The B. C. Court of Appeal unanimously decided that the trial judge who 
had admitted the evidence of the heroin found in the accused's hand in 
circumstances as explained above, was a correct decision. 
Since the Court of Appeal agreed, the trial Judge's comments are 
interesting: 
"Turning now to the case at Bar, would any ordinary right 
thinking person think that seizing and searching a 
suspected hard drug trafficker for possession of illicit 
drugs be shocking to the community? The answer is self 
evident. Even though search and seizure of the accused 
would be regarded ~t law as an unreasonable infringement 
of a right provided by section 8 of the Charter, I have 
concluded that, having regard to all the circumstances of 
this case, police conduct here was not shocking such that 
the admission of the evidence derived from these seizures 
would necessarily cast the administration of justice into 
disrepute". 
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The Justices of the Court of Appeal wrote separate reasons for judge-
ment, each reaching the same conclusion. The Chief Justice emphasized 
the following points in the last paragraph of his judgment: 
1. The constable's suspicion that the accused was in possession of 
heroin was proven correct; 
2. The offence alleged against the accused was serious; 
3. The officer was not acting at random or out of malice towards 
the accused; 
4. The use of the throat hold was to prevent the loss or destruc-
tion of evidence; and 
5. The admission in evidence of the heroin found was not unfair to 
the accused: 
"Having all these facts before him, he (the trial judge) 
decided to admit the only evidence which could convict 
her. Without justifying the use of the throat hold as a 
general practice, I cannot say that the judge erred in 
the circumstances of this case". 
Conviction upheld. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal, within a few days of dealing with the 
Collins case, rendered judgment in an appeal by the Crown in the Cohen 
case (CA 821475). In that case the police officers had reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the accused was in possession of cocaine. 
The officer 'seized' the accused by her throat. Her mouth was found 
to contain nothing nature did not intend to be there, however, in her 
purse six packages of cocaine were found. At the preliminary hearing 
defence counsel persuaded the judge that the choking amounted to an 
unreasonable search, that it was "shocking" to the comm.unity and that 
admitting evidence thereby obtained would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Although the search of the purse was lawful 
and reasonable, the search of the mouth and the purse, in these cir-
cumstances, was held to be one transaction of searching by the provin-
cial court judge. 
Knowing how the Judge viewed this issue, defence counsel promptly 
applied to re-elect the mode of trial from judge and jury to trial by 
magistrate without a jury - to wit by this kind judge. The applica-
tion was granted, the evidence· so far heard (the remnants of it) was 
ordered to be treated as ·evidence at the trial and the charge was dis-
missed. 
6 
The Crown and defence counsel conceded that the moment the accused was 
seized by the throat she was under arrest and that the search of the 
mouth was unreasonable* in the circumstances. However, the Court of 
Appeal disagreed that the entire search was one transaction. The 
search of the purse was separate and lawful. Therefore, the discovery 
of the cocaine was part of a legal and reasonable· search. The court 
did, therefore, not have to rule if the choke hold (when used to 
search the muth) makes the search unreasonable. 
Two of the three Justices of the B. C. Court of Appeal held that the 
Crown's appeal should be allowed, the acquittal set aside and a new 
trial conducted. 
* * * * * 
* How much bearing this had on the concession made by the Crown is 
difficult to infer from the reasons for Judgment but the police 
officer testified in cross-examination that his reasonable and 
probable grounds were in regards to possession of cocaine. He agreed 
that persons hide heroin in their mouth and cenceded ~that he had never 
found anyone carrying cocaine in the mouth. 
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REGUKGITATING OH SECO:ND BREATH TEST 
UFUSIRG 'lO GIVE SAMPLE 
Regina v. Brown County Court of Westminster New Westminster Registry 
X82-8767 
The accused gave, upon demand, an adequate sample of his breath for 
the first analysis. No reading could be obtained from what breath he 
gave as a second sample. In spite of his testimony at trial that "he 
had been trying as hard as he could", he was convicted of refusing to 
give a sample of breath. 
The accused appealed his conviction on several grounds. The only one 
of interest is the accused's claim that there was a lack of proof that 
the "instrument" was in proper working order. 
The constable had testified that he "got the instrument ready" and had 
analyzed one sample of breath given by the accused. For the second 
analysis the accused, in the officer's opinion, simply did provide an 
inadequate breath sample. However, the accused swore he tried as hard 
as he could and the Crown did not prove that the instrument was at 
that moment not blocked. The defence asserted that if the accused is 
to be believed, it raised the possibility to infer that the instrument 
was not properly working, particularly in the absence of any evidence 
that for the second test it was in good working order. 
The Court did not go along with the defence's theory. It held that in 
section 235(1) C.C. the obligation is on the accused to provide "such 
a sample of breath as is in the opinion of a qualified technician is 
necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made", etc. The Crown had 
presented the opinion of a qualified technician that the sample 
provided was not adequate and "that is all that was necessary" in the 
circumstances. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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DEMAND WITHOUT UASONABLE ARD PKOBABLE GROURDS 
R. v. Thurlow County Court of Yale Vernon Registry No. 08341 
The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident and admitted to 
have consumed some wine with his dinner. Although he showed no 
symptoms of impairment the attending officer demanded samples of the 
accused's breath. The accused complied and a certificate under 
section 237(l)(f) C.C. resulted. 
The trial Judge had held that a demand under section 235 c.c. can only 
be made upon reasonable and probable grounds that the accused had 
committed the offence of impaired driving. The lack of such grounds 
meant that the demand was not pursuant to section 235 and, therefore, 
the certificate had no evidentiary value. As a consequence the 
accused was acquitted of "over 80 ml.". 
The Crown appealed and the County Court Judge saw no reason why the 
certificate should not be proof of its content. The demand was pur-
porting to be pursuant to section 235 C.C. and in compliance with a 
precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada*, the certificate was 
admissible in evidence as proof of its content. 
Appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
Note: Although the reasons for judgment do not mention this, it should 
be noted that had the accused refused to supply samples of his 
breath, the lack of the reasonable and probable grounds prere-
quisite to the demand could have provided him with a reasonable 
excuse for the refusal. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Billing (1975) 24 C.C.C. (2d) 81 
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PASSENGER'S POSSESSION OF A STOLER CAR 
The Queen v. Terrence, Supreme Court of Canada March 24 1983 
The seventeen year old accused was invited by a friend to go for a 
ride in "his brother-in-law's car". The car, in fact, (a new Camero) 
had been stolen that evening from a garage. The accused testified 
that it was logical for him to believe the car was not stolen as he 
knew his friend's brother-in-law had a wreck for a car and was due for 
a new one; furthermore his friend had the keys for the car. 
The ride ended up at a police roadblock after a chase. When the car 
slowed, the accused "rolled out" and escaped across a field. 
When tried for possession of stolen property, the Crown had not been 
able to contradict the accused's version of what happened or rebut his 
claim of no knowledge that the car was stolen. However, the 
Provincial Court Judge "utterly disbelieved" the accused and from that 
inferred that the accused had knowledge. In regards to the requisite 
ingredients to possession, the trial judge had held that, although the 
accused was not the driver, he had, in a sense, control of the car in 
that the driver had control with his knowledge and consent. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and had 
held that the essential measure of control necessary to show posses-
sion as defined in section 3(4) of the Criminal Code was not present. 
The Crown appealed claiming that the accused had culpable possession. 
It was proved that the accused was a passenger in the stolen car, 
which the Crown claimed he knew to be stolen. He had also consented 
to the possession of the vehicle by the other person. 
Actually there was no evidence adduced at the trial that the accused 
had knowledge that the car was stolen. This knowledge had been 
inferred by the trial judge via the doctrine of recent possession. 
Unexplained possession of recently stolen goods entitles the Court to 
draw the inference that the person who had possession committed the 
crime by which the goods were obtained or had knowledge that they were 
so obtained. When the accused did explain and was "utterly disbe-
lieved", the Court reasoned (based on precedent)* that the disbelieved 
evidence is incapable of rebutting the presumption. In other words, 
disbelieved evidence has no evidentiary value. 
* R. v. Proudlock [1979] 1 S.C.R. 525. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada held 
I. That before the doctrine of recent possession applies, posses-
sion has to be proved. The Crown had failed to do so as it 
showed no control of consent on the part of the accused. 
2. Also the accused was not a party to the offence of theft or the 
possession of the car as the Crown failed to show that the 
accused had a common intention with the thief or the person who 
in fact had possession of the car. 
Crown's Appeals Dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
* * * * * 
Vi.pre: 
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TO SAY VllKR mu ME BORR IS .BEARSAr 
PKOOF OF AGE 
•strf.ctly apeakf.ng one cannot ezactly know bis own 
age except upon hearsay inforaatf.on; for be is not 
capable of knowing this, or anything, untf.1 an 
apprecf.able ti.lie after bi.rth•. • 
Regina v. Botel County Court of Vancouver Island Nanaimo Registry 
Cr. 2720 April 1983. 
The accused was charged with having sexual intercourse with a female 
person under the age of fourteen years. The girl's mother was not 
available to testify and the Crown produced (besides the girl's testi-
mony) a birth certificate. The question was the adequacy of this 
evidence. 
It seems that the Courts have been inclined to accept the evidence of 
older persons in respect to their ages and rejected that of the 
younger ones while the source of the information is the same for 
both. No one was consciously present at birth and cannot vouch for 
the accuracy of the information in regards to date or location. Both 
must rely on documents or what was told them. In other words, none of 
us can attest to his or her age as we must rely on the credibility of 
parent(s) or anyone who was present at our birth. 
The experts on evidence have suggested that testimony like "I am 20 
years of age" or "I was born on January 1, 1954", should be treated as 
a question of "testimonial qualifications" and regarded as admissible 
in evidence. Alternatively it can be an exception to the hearsay rule 
as "an assertion of the family reputation". However, the question 
remains if this last resort measure should only apply if no family 
(direct evidence) is available. 
And what must we do about the above mentioned distinction we make 
between the older and the younger generation? Needless to say that in 
the "teens" category the age is often more crucial to the charge. For 
example, is the person a juvenile; is he under nineteen in a drinking 
charge; was the victim under the age of fourteen as in this case. 
Nevertheless, to establish age the law of evidence should be the same 
for all. 
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After reviewing numerous cases with these specific and similar eviden-
tiary problems, the Court held: 
"The recent authorities support the position taken 
by counsel for the Crown, that the individual is 
entitled to state in the witness box his or her own 
age. It is a question, ultimately, for the jury to 
decide whether or not that evidence, plus any other 
evidence which is tendered, satisfied the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 
complainant is under fourteen years of age or is the 
age stated". 
However, the Court warned that where the witness only knows his or her 
age because of what he or she was told, it may not satisfy the judge 
of the facts. In addition, persons who had associated with the com-
plainant in this case, were allowed to give their opinion of her age. 
* * * * * 
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HIT Am>. RUN 
The Queen v. Roche, Supreme Court of Canada April 1983 
The accused backed his car into one parked in a laneway. Apparently 
the collision was not a gentle one and considerable damage was 
caused. The accused, armed with .a pool cue, stopped and approached 
the other car. As the occupants of the victim's car alighted the 
accused got back in his own car and rammed the other car with such 
force that it moved forty feet further into the laneway. 
Although on the surface the incident seeD1S to be more one of mischief, 
the accused was, at trial, convicted of Hit & Run but had this verdict 
reversed on Appeal. The Crown then took a lingering argument over the 
interpretation of section 233 of the Criminal Code (which is the heart 
of the issue in this case) to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Section 233 says in subsection (2) that anyone who is involved in an 
accident and fails to stop, identify himself "AND" does not assist the 
injured, commits a crime (provided, of course, that this failure 
resulted from an intent to escape Civil or criminal liability). Fore-
seeing great difficulties in proving such intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt, Parliament provides in subsection (3) that failure to stop, 
identify oneself "AND" assist the injured is "proof" (not merely 
evidence) of such intent. If, for instance, a person accused of the 
crime of Hit and Run exercises his right to remain silent on the issue 
of his intent (his reason for leaving the scene) then, if there is no 
evidence to the contrary, he must, at trial, rebut this "presumption 
of intent" on the balance of probabilities. 
Needless to say that if in subsection (2) the "AND" means that it must 
be interpreted conjunctively absurd situation would arise. It could 
mean that at an accident scene where no one was injured, all a driver 
has to do is stop and then leave or if there are injuries, assist the 
injured and leave. After all, the "AND" indicates that the duties the 
section imposes must all be ignored before one commits "Hit and Run". 
The same goes for subsection (3) the presumption of the intent to 
escape civil or criminal liability. Taking the subsection at its 
word, it is of no assistance to the Crown unless the driver failed to 
stop, identify himself AND assist the injured if there are any. 
The Courts across Canada have varied considerably in the interpreta-
tion of subsection (3), although in respect to subsection (2), the 
offence section, they pretty well have agreed that failure of anyone 
of the duties it imposes will constitute the offence 
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When this case reached the B. c. Court of Appeal, the majority of the 
Justices held that failure to carry out any of the three duties 
imposed by subsection (2) may constitute an offence, however, before 
we may infer the prerequisite criminal intent by using the provision 
of subsection (3), all of the duties must have been ignored. The 
Crown appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada which 
cleared the matter up by holding: 
"I think, therefore, that if Parliament intended that the 
accused could commit the offence by failing to do any one 
of three things specified in subsection (2), Parliament 
intended, also, that the presumption provision would be 
applicable in any case where the accused failed to do any 
of the things specified" 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Conviction restored 
* * * * * 
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. SELF PJWTECTIOR 
VEAPOB DARGEIWUS TO THE PUBLIC PEACE 
Regina v. Ali B. c. Court of Appeal 811156 
In November of 1982, the B. c. Court of Appeal dealt with a easel 
where a young man was found carrying a knife while walking down the 
street. He had explained that although he used the knife for many 
legitimate purposes he would use it to protect himself, "if I get 
jumped or someone comes on to me". The trial judge had held, in 
essence, that where a person carries an item that he would use to 
def end himself and carries it for that event, then the item is a 
weapon dangerous to the public. The B. c. Court of Appeal reversed 
that decision. Many believe that this precedent created a full proof 
defence for the offence of carrying a weapon dangerous to the public 
peace. All one has to say is that he carried it to protect himself. 
This is a misconception of what the B. C. Court of Appeal said. As a 
matter of fact the Court gave an example of what it meant. A woman 
may wear a hat with a hat-pin. If she was asked if she would use it 
to defend herself and the answer was "Yes" this does not mean that she 
carried a weapon dangerous to the public peace. 
One month later the B. C. Court of Appeal gave a decision on the same 
question in this Ali case which demonstrates that the Sulland decision 
did not change the law. 
Ali and a number of his friends were driving on city streets offering 
gratuitous insults to women ("street people"), and seemed to invite an 
altercation with a group of others. Police stopped the car and found 
that the accused had a carpenter's hammer in his possession. In the 
back of the car an axe was found but the accused claimed to be unaware 
of its presence and denied ownership. When questioned for what pur-
pose he had the hammer in his possession the accused explained that 
people get murdered every day and that he had it "in case I need it 
for protection". He asked the officer what he would do if "faggots" 
were coming at him with "clubs and two-by-fours". When asked about 
the near altercation with the "street people" the accused claimed they 
were kicking his car. · 
The B. c. Court of Appeal unanimously held that the accused (who 
appealed his conviction of possession of a weapon dangerous to the 
public peace) "was looking for trouble and possessed the hammer to use 
in the event that the trouble he was looking for arose.•• 
* * * * * 
1 Sulland v. The Queen CA 820276 - see page 14 of volume 10 of this 
publication. 
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CllAltTEll OF RIGHTS ARD FREEDOMS 
DEHARD - TRARSPOR.T IN POLICE WAGON - DETERTION 
Regina v. Morrison 
CC821618. 
Vancouver County Court March 1983 Registry 
The accused went through a red traffic light and was stopped. He 
showed symptoms of impairment and the officer made, upon reasonable 
and probable grounds, a demand for samples of breath. The "Police 
wagon" was called, the accused was secured in the back of it, and 
transported to the police station where he went, after pretty sophis-
ticated attempts to ruin the possibility of an accurate analysis, 
through the motions of giving samples of his breath. He was then 
charged with "refusal" and informed of his right to counsel under 
section lO(b) of the Charter. 
The accused appealed his conviction of refusing to give samples of his 
breath. 
The interesting ground for appeal was that since he was not told of 
his right to counsel until arrested long after the demand was made 
.• the learned trial judge erred in failing to 
exclude evidence that was obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied rights or freedoms guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms". 
What is refreshing is to see the matter of "detention" being raised. 
On page 3 of volume 11 of this publication! comment is made how it 
seems simply to be assumed by some Courts that when a person is under 
demand to give a sample of his breath he is detained. In this case 
that was not done. It was assumed that the definition of "detention" 
had not changed since the Charter became effective. Therefore the 
County Court reviewed the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada on 
the meaning of that word "detention"2 as it is in the Bill of Rights 
1960. 
1 Regina v. Davignon County Court of the Cariboo 
2 Chromiak v. The Queen ~9 C.C.C. (2d) 257. See also page 3 of Volume 
of this publication. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada said that whenever the words "to detain" 
are used it is always in association with "actual physical res-
traint". It held that that was not the legal situation" of one who 
has been required to accompany a peace officer for the purpose of 
having a breath test taken". The Supreme Court reasoned: 
"The test may well be negative and, in such a case, it 
would be quite wrong to say that this person was arrested 
or detained and then released. Detained means held in 
custody as is apparent from such provisions as s. 15 of 
the Immigration Act ...... 
The County Court Judge concluded from this that the accused Morrison 
was not arrested or detained and it was, therefore, not necessary for 
the officer to inform the accused of his rights. This made it 
unnecessary to consider if the administration of justice was brought 
into disrepute; the evidence was admissible and 
The appeal was dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
Comment: It seems not unlikely that this issue will either be 
appealed further or debated in other cases. The law is clear that 
only being under demand "to accompany" and give samples of breath does 
not mean a person is detained or arrested. However, what happens sub-
sequent to the making of the demand may well cause a detention. The 
Supreme Court of canada said that when a person complies with direc-
tions police officers are entitled to issue, he is not in custody. 
When he tries to get away to avoid obeying the test, then a detention 
or arrest may well result. However, it seems reasonable that when a 
physical control is imposed such as being locked in the back of the 
police van or handcuffed or in the rear of a patrol car equipped with 
a shield and without door handles, that the Courts will hold that in 
such circumstances, there is custody and hence detention. It should 
be noted that arrest includes detention but that there can be deten-
tion without arrest. Had the accused been transported as an ordinary 
passenger there seems to be no doubt that he would not have been 
detained. 
* * * * * 
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OVERSIGHT ON 'DIE PAR.T OF POLICE m IBFORH 
DETAIRED PERSON OF llGBT TO COUHSEL 
Regina v. Fugard Vancouver County Court, November 1982 Vancouver 
Registry CC820806 
Shortly after the Charter .of Rights and Freedoms became effective the 
accused was found on private property at night in circumstances which 
caused the officer to arrest him for trespassing by night. The off i-
cer told the accused the reason for the arrest and that he had the 
right to remain silent. However, the accused was not informed of his 
right to retain and instruct counsel. The officer searched the 
accused and found a screwdriver and a flashlight on him and later, at 
the station, a pair of socks. 
An hour after the arrest the officer informed the accused of his right 
to counsel. By this time all the items the Court later considered 
essential to the proceedings, had been found on the accused. This 
resulted in a voir dire to determine if the violation of the accused's 
----
rights should result in exclusion of the exhibits (the accused was 
tried for possession of house breaking tools). 
When the accused was informed of his right to counsel he did not take 
advantage of the opportunity to contact a lawyer. He said: "No, it 
is too early in the morning". Furthermore the Court held that the 
officer's error was not for any oblique purpose and was simply an 
oversight due to the incident having occurred very shortly after the 
Charter was proclaimed. 
The Court reasoned that had the officer informed the accused of his 
right to counsel at the scene, his search of the accused would not 
have depended on whether the accused wanted to contact a lawyer. It 
is well established at common law* that authority to arrest includes 
the entitlement to search the suspect and it was a result of the 
search that the tools were found. Said the Court: 
"I think that upon an examination of all the circum-
stances, and more particularly with respect to the reac-
tion of the accused when he was informed of his right to 
counsel, to admit this evidence would not necessarily 
bring the administration of justice· into aisrepute. 
Rather, I think under these particular circumstances, not 
to admit it would, in fact, bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute" 
Exhibits admitted in evidence. 
* * * * * 
* Laporte and The Queen (1972) 8 C.C.C. (2d) 343 
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CHAR.TEI. OF 1.IGBTS AHO FREEDOMS 
DROKS Di SEAR.CB VAllRABT 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Thompson County Court of Yale March 1983, Kelowna Registry 
CR95/82 
Police armed with a search warrant, searched the accused's home. This 
resulted in a conviction of possession of marijuana which the accused 
appealed. 
The warrant recorded a belief that ~arijuana was being cultivated at a 
certain address. As it turned out the house number was wrong and was 
one of a single dwelling. The address where the search took place 
contained two apartments and that of the accused was searched. In any 
event, there were a number of errors, each of which, by itself would 
not have been adequate to invalidate the search. However, the County 
Court Judge found that the aggregate of them did. He found that the 
officers had been careless, indifferent and unseeing. 
Without saying what specific rights or freedoms were infringed or 
denied by these errors, the judge invoked subsection (2) of section 
24 of the Charter and excluded the evidence that resulted from the 
search. He did so on the basis that society would be shocked by the 
acceptance of the evidence. 
Appeal allowed 
Accused acquitted 
Comment: The Judge seems to have invoked the exclusionary rule to 
discipline the police officers which probably is not a judicial 
function according to other reasons for judgment. 
It can only be deduced that the judge must have thought that the 
errors in the warrant made the search unreasonable and in violation of 
section 8 of the Charter. As only a denial of a right or freedom can 
activate the remedy of excluding evidence. 
* * * * * 
Regina v. Acheson 
Registry CC433 
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EVIDENCE TO THE CONTIWlY 
-KIKACDLOUS FAcrs· 
County Court of Yale February 1983 Kem.loops 
At 2: 10 and 2: 30 a.m. analysis of the accused's breath resulted in 
readings of 130 and 120 miligrams respectively. 
The accused was charged with "over 80 ml.•• and released. 
Within an hour he was found driving again and a new demand for samples 
of breath was made of him. Readings identical to those above - 130 
and 120 miligrams respectively, resulted from tests at 3:21 and 3:38 
a.m. 
The Crown and defence "agreed" that the accused had nothing to drink 
between the two sets of tests yet the Crown's evidence of the blood-
alcohol levels was adduced by means of certificates and it depended on 
the presumption that in "the absence of evidence to the contrary" the 
blood-alcohol level at the time of analysis was the same as at the 
times of driving. 
The accused claimed that the "curious facts" of identical alcohol 
levels with nearly an hour in between the two sets of tests was suffi-
cient to doubt the accuracy of the analyses. The blood-alcohol level 
was on its way down during the first set of tests; then without having 
anything to drink, it increased 10 ml. only to reduce by the same rate 
during the second set of tests. This impossibility or miracle was, 
the accused argued, evidence to the contrary which precludes reliance 
on the presumption of equalization. During the trial, which resulted 
in convictions, experts conceded that the two sets of readings could 
not possibly be accurate if the accused had nothing to drink between 
his release and second apprehension. The accused appealed. 
The County Court Judge held that a demonstrated inaccuracy in the 
analysis of the blood-alcohol level does not amount to "evidence to 
the contrary" unless it is of "sufficient magnitude to leave a doubt 
as to the blood-alcohol content of the accused being over the allow-
able limit"*· In view of the tests having resulted in readings 50% in 
excess of the legal limit, the County Court Judge held that "the evi-
dence to the contrary" could withstand the quantitative and the quali-
tative tests 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Cresthwait [1980] 6 M.V.R. 1. (Supreme Court of Canada) 
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CHA1lTEJl OF JUGBTS ARD FUEDOHS 
POSSESSION OF HOUSE-BREAKING TOOLS 
R. v. Holmes - Ontario Court of Appeal - March 1983 
On page 33 of Volume 11 of this publication it was indicated that an 
Ontario County Court had held that section 309(1) of the Criminal Code 
was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence guaranteed in 
section ll(d) of the Charter. The Crown appealed that decision to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Section 309(1) C.C. states: 
"Everyone who without lawful excuse, the proof of which 
lies upon him, has · in his possession any instrument 
suitable for house-breaking, vault breaking or safe 
breaking, under circumstances that give rise to a reason-
able inference that the instrument has been used or is or 
was intended to be used for house-breaking, vault-
breaking or safe-breaking, is guilty of an indictable 
offence ...... 
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the opinion of the County 
Court Judge and held that the section does not create a reverse onus 
at all. The Court of Appeal said that the Crown must prove the essen-
tial ingredients to the offence. Nowhere does the section displace 
the onus of that proof in respect to any of those ingredients. In 
other words it does not relieve the Crown from proving all ingredients 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
One of the ingredients to this offence is that the possession is in 
circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of intent to 
use 'the instruments for an unlawful use. This calls for an objective 
rather than a subjective test. The masked man with a crowbar in a 
back alley in the middle of the night or a plumber in the daytime 
making his service calls with a van full of tools describe the 
distinction. To draw an inference that the latter has the tools for 
an unlawful purpose (other than the bill for his service) is of 
course, absurd. However, the former (the masked man) has some 
explaining to do. 
A reasonable doubt about any of the essential ingredients must result 
in acquittal. The proof on the accused is simply one of explanation: 
"I am the plumber" etc. The section is not in any way inconsistent 
with the presumption of innocence 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Trial ordered to proceed 
* * * * * 
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CBAK.TEit OF IUGHTS ARD FKEEDOMS 
mmncovn OFFICER IB <ZLL WITH ACCUSED 
ADKISSIBILITY OF STATEMERTS KADE 
Regina v. Mason B. C. Supreme Court Vancouver No. CC821292 January 
1983 
These reasons for judgment are strictly in relation to a voir dire 
conducted for the purpose to determine the admissibility of statements 
made by the accused to a policeman who shared his cell and who the 
accused believed to be a fellow prisoner. 
The accused was "picked up" by the two patrol members on instructions 
from detectives who wished to question the accused in connection with 
a homicide. The two officers did as they were told but the accused 
demanded to know why he was being detained. All he was told was that 
"major crime detectives" wanted to question him. The accused was 
placed in cells and taken to the detective offices three hours after 
being booked. There he was informed for the first time, of his rights 
and why he was being detained. 
The arguments that arose from these events should be of considerable 
interest to police. The officers who "picked up" the accused, did so 
they thought and told the accused, for the purpose of investigation 
and questioning. There is no such charge or provision in law that 
authorizes that practice I Arrests can only be made if statute or 
common law provides the authority to do so. 
When the detectives were questioned during the voir dire it became 
clear that they did have reasonable and probable grounds for believing 
that the accused had committed a murder. However, the arresting 
officers had no such grounds. The question then is if the belief and 
knowledge of the detectives could be imputed to the officers who made 
the arrest. The defence claimed that this could not be done and 
argued that the accused had been arbitrarily detained. 
In responding to this submission, Mr. Justice Berger said: 
"These officers were acting on instructions from the 
radio operator; the police as a corporate body had 
grounds appropriate for detaining the accused. It seems 
to me that we have gone far beyond the days of the 
village policeman and we should not apply unrealistic 
standards to police work today. Often officers will be 
given the responsibility of detaining an accused while it 
is others in the same force who possess the knowledge 
that justifies the detention". 
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In view of the reasonable and probable grounds the detectives had• 
there was therefore no arbitrary detention. 
The Court then had to address the apparent violations of section lO(a) 
of the Charter and section 29 of the Criminal Code. Both require that 
an arrested person nust be informed for the reason ·of the arrest. The 
Charter dictates that this be done •promptly". The B. C. Supreme 
Court held that there was a breach of section IO( a) of the Charter. 
It can hardly be said that in the circumstances• the accused was 
promptly told of the reason for his detention. 
In regards to the requirements under section lO(b) of the Charter the 
Justice found that there was no breach. A detained person must be 
informed of his right to counsel and when he wishes to exercise those 
rights he must be afforded an opportunity to do so without delay. It 
does not say he DI.1st be informed promptly. The accused had not asked 
to consult counsel and was informed of his rights by the detectives 
before they questioned him. Therefore the statement he made to the 
detectives was not obtained by infringements of the Charter. 
It should be emphasized that the Court was considering the admissibil-
ity of the statements made to the detectives and the undercover 
officer. This in respect to section 24(2) of the Charter which states 
that evidence obtained by means which violate provisions of the 
Charter shall be excluded "if it is established that, having regard to 
all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute". 
There were no problems about the voluntariness of the statements, a 
prerequisite to admission in evidence quite separate from the ones 
considered here. 
The undercover officer• as long as the accused was unaware of his 
status, was not a person in authority. In respect to the statement to 
the detectives, there was no doubt about voluntariness. 
The sole issue then, using the poisonous tree principle as an analogy, 
was whether the violation on the part of police of section lO(a) of 
the Charter was a fungus sufficient to have probably contaminated the 
fruits on the branches. Or• as the Court did put it: "The key here 
was causation". The causation being, of ceurse, J,:he violation of 
section lO(a) of the Charter by the arresting officers at the outset 
of the detention. The Court held: 
"These statements were obtained by questioning, not by 
breaches of the Charter. The chain of causation, such as 
it was, was broken when the detectives quite properly 
advised the accused of his rights under section IO(b)". 
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Had the accused not been so advised then probably the statements given 
to the detectives and subsequently to the undercover officer would 
have been obtained by breaches of the Charter and would have compelled 
the Court to consider exclusion under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
Statements ruled admissible. 
Note: The Court made a comment that the accused perhaps had a right 
under Section 24(1) of the Charter to sue for damages for the breach 
under section lO(a) of the Charter. 
* * * * * 
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BREATH SAMPLE - AS SOOH AS PllACTICABLE 
OFFICER. DELAYED OH ACCOUNT OF ASSISTIHG FELLOW OFFICER. 
Regina v. Pearce County Court of Westminster New Westminster 
Registry X82-8765 
While on his way to the police station with the accused who was under 
arrest for impaired driving, the officer learned by radio that another 
police car in the immediate vacinity was chasing a motorcycle. Not 
that it was an emergency or that he was requested to do so, but in 
compliance with what he perceived to be police policy, the arresting 
officer varied from his course to the police station to assist his 
colleague. 
The colleague lost the motorcycle but the officer transporting the 
accused continued the search for the bike and was eventually success-
ful in locating it. When the colleague arrived at the scene the 
officer continued to the police station. The rendering of assistance 
was the cause of a delay of approximately twenty minutes. As a result 
the first breath sample was taken forty-six minutes after the arrest 
was made at a location three kilometres from the station. 
The accused was convicted of "over 80 ml." and appealed claiming that 
as the samples of his breath were not taken as soon as practicable the 
certificate of analysis was not proof of his blood-alcohol content at 
the time of his driving. 
The County Court Judge referred to cases where the same arguments were 
advanced and the interpretations of the term "as soon as practicable" 
were given. "As soon as practicable" is totally distinct from "as 
soon as possible". It must be considered in view of all circumstances 
and means when it is capable and feasible of being done. It means 
"within a reasonably prompt time under the circumstances". 
The Courts have also emphasized that not satisfactorily explained 
delays that prejudice the accused are not in compliance with the 
provision that samples must be taken as soon as practicable. 
The County Court Judge found that considering the circumstances the 
delay had not prejudiced the accused and that it was satisfactorily 
explained. If the delay was not connected with the administration of 
the tests or had interfered with the accused's access to counsel, or 
had prejudiced the accused in any way, the Court would have found that 
the tests were not takefl within the appropriate time. Such conclu-
sion, the Judge said, could not be drawn in the circumstances of this 
case. 
In regards to the "prejudice", the Court considered when the accused 
had done his drinking and what the results of the analyses were. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld 
* * * * * 
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ROADSIDE PROHIBITION TO DRIVE 
DOES JACK OF PROOF 'DIAT SUBSEQUDT ADKIRISTKATIVE 
DUTIES VERE COMPLIED WITH PROVIDE A DEFENCE? 
R. v. Hardy 
CC830271 
B. C. Supreme Court May 1983 - Vancouver Registry 
The accused was prohibited to drive for a period of 24 hours by a 
constable who had reason to suspect that the accused had consumed 
alcohol. Shortly after the accused was found driving and he was 
charged with driving while prohibited (section 88(1) M.V.A.). In 
respect to imposing the period of prohibition on the accused, every-
thing was done properly. However, as required by the policy of his 
force, the officer left the copy of the prohibition notice in a tray 
designated for this purpose. He had no idea if the notice was forwar-
ded to the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles as required under section 
214(10) M. V .A. Lack of proof that this was done, caused the Provin-
cial Court Judge to acquit the accused. 
The Crown appealed. 
Section 214(5) M.V.A. states that unless the prohibition imposed by a 
police officer is terminated under other conditions of the section the 
prohibition is for a period of 24 hours from the time the officer asks 
the driver to surrender his driver's licence. 
The obligation to report such a prohibition to the Superintendent of 
motor vehicles imposed by subsection ( 1) is merely an administrative 
provision which does not amount to an essential ingredient to the 
offence of driving while prohibited. 
This being the opinion of the County Court Judge, the accused was 
convicted. 
* * * * * 
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DUUSS - UNDEltCOVEll OPERATION 
The Queen v. Gardiner - County Court of Prince Rupert, April 1983 
Registry #CC197/12 
An ex Green Beret member approached a police officer with a scheme to 
get stolen hand-guns off the street. As a result another officer 
posed as an arms dealer from the U. S. The so-called dealer had a M16 
automatic rifle with him which he was willing to exchange for hand-
guns. 
A meeting was arranged between the undercover officer and the 20 year 
old accused. Polie interupted the meeting and arrested the accused 
who was in possession of a stolen revolver. 
The meeting was arranged by the ex Green Beret who boasted to the 
accused and another "gullible and impressionable" youth that in 
addition he had been a member of the C.l.A. and Israeli Intelligence. 
To corroborate his claim to fame the ex Beret demonstrated some iooves 
and holds that injured his prospective clients. The whole scheme, 
said the Court, as presented by the Beret "would have made a normal 
person suspicious". The Court concluded that both the accused and his 
friend lived in fantasy-land to believe that the stolen revolvers were 
so desparately needed by mercenaries in Nicaragua to "penetrate a dam" 
that an M16 automatic rifle would be given in exchange. 
The ex Beret went as far as threatening to blow-off the accused's head 
with one of his own revolvers unless he made the exchange. Further-
more the accused was made to believe that secret agents had him under 
observation. A failure to make the exchange would result in being 
shot either by the agents or the ex Beret. 
As a consequence, the accused was far from constipated when the zero 
hour for the exchange arrived. The undercover agent, the so-called 
U.S. gun dealer, testified that the accused was "very nervous and 
fearful when the deal was made in the motel" and that he had been told 
by the ex Beret that the accused was and would be "scared, nervous and 
afraid". 
The ex Beret was rewarded with his keep for a few days and his wherea-
bouts were not known at the time of trial • 
. 
The conversation between the accused and the under-cover officer at 
the time of the exchange was taped. The arresting officer had used 
the tape to make some notes and then erased it. The failure to pre-
serve this important evidence resulted in the Court to "draw the most 
favourable inference that I can for the accused". 
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The accused raised the defence of duress as described in section 17 of 
the Criminal Code. It excuses persons from committing some offences 
(including possession of stolen property and possession of an unregis-
tered restricted weapon, the offences alleged against the accused) if 
done under compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily 
harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed. 
The problems in applying the defence of duress to this case are that 
the section implies a sudden threat and an immediate consequence of 
death or injury. It seems the defence is only available when there is 
a gun-to-the-head at the time of the crime; an ugly choice of commit-
ting the crime or be killed or injured. The accused became gradually 
involved with time to withdraw, seek protection and escape the threat 
and danger he perceived. 
The accused had become voluntarily involved and as things gradually 
developed the threats and fear resulted with lots of opportunity on 
the part of the accused to extricate himself. Although the scheme had 
the flavour of a "Grade B movie" and the accused and his friend were 
under a "Modern Merlin's spell" according to the County Court, a 
conviction was registered for the eight charges. 
* * * * * 
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"OVEll 80 ML.· ARD THE DEFEllCE OF ADTOHATISH 
R. v. Litchfield County Court of Westminster 
Westminster Registry X82-9176 
April 1983 New 
The accused was seen "careening" out of the parking lot of a hotel 
He was found to have a blood-alcohol content .. substantially in excess 
of 80 ml." and was convicted accordingly. 
At his trial the evidence revealed the following: 
"The accused drank approximately six beers in three hours 
at the hotel. He got in an argument with his wife and 
was bodily removed and landed with his head on a motor-
cycle. He then went into his car where he had a mickey 
of Tequilla of which he availed himself". 
The accused said that he cannot remember anything between the time he 
hit his head and waking up in a police cell. 
The defence was that the six beer over the three hour period could not 
have been the cause of the high blood-alcohol content. Therefore, the 
"substantial excess" was due to the Tequilla which was consumed while 
the accused was "not responsive". Hence the intake of alcohol was an 
unconscious act and not a voluntary intake and his subsequent driving 
lacked the mens rea. Furthermore the departure from normal driving 
was probably due ~the blow to his head. This resulted in an acquit-
tal of the second charge of impaired driving. 
The accused appealed his conviction of .. over 80 ml." claiming that the 
defence of automatism was available to him in respect to that charge. 
A psychiatrist testified that the consequences of concussion and 
intoxication are similar and the Crown as well as the defence could 
marshal! support from his testimony. Based on the facts as he found 
them, the trial judge had rejected the defence of automatism. He said 
that getting in the car and drinking the Tequilla and the subsequent 
driving were consistent with a person who knows what he is doing and 
inconsistent with automatism. 
This then begs an obvio~s question. If there was a level of unaware-
ness of what he was doing to the extent that he was acquitted of 
impaired driving, how could there be sufficient awareness to drive 
with a blood-alcohol content in excess of 80 ml. 
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For the "over 80 ml." charge the trial judge had considered that 
consumption of beer and Tequilla were voluntary and both were with an 
awareness of the effects they would have. Furthermore the accused 
knew what he was doing when he drove. In respect to the impaired 
driving charge the trial judge "looked not at the ~tandard of driving 
and its cause but at the ingestion of alcohol and at the act of 
driving to determine whether or not those were acts of the appellant's 
(accused's) own will". 
The accused knew he was drinking and knew he was driving and the 
analyses proved a blood-alcohol content over the legal limit. There-
fore, the Crown's case was complete. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction of "over 80 ml." upheld 
* * * * * 
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RBASOKABLE BOTICE OF CER.TIPICATE OF ANALYSIS 
R. v. Parker County Court of Vancouver April 1983 No. CC821536 
The accused was convicted of "over 80 ml.". He appealed claiming that 
the Crown failed to prove that he had received reasonable notice of 
the intention to adduce the certificate in evidence or that he was 
served with a copy of it. 
When examined by the prosecutor the qualified technician was asked: 
Q.: And at the bottom of the form under the heading 'Notice of 
Intention to Produce Certificate' again the signature of the 
person who served that notice, again is that your signature 
Constable?" 
A. : "Yes, it is". 
Q. : "And prior to serving that notice on the accused • • ", etc. 
(evidence was then led to show that the copy was a true copy). 
The above question was the only evidence that the copy was served on 
the accused. This the accused claimed was inadequate to be proof of a 
reasonable notice. The County Court Judge agreed and quashed the 
conviction. 
Appeal allowed 
Note: C.Ounsel brought to the attention of the Court that it is not an 
uncommon practice for trial courts to reject any submissions 
regarding the admissibility of a certificate of analysis Wltil 
the case has been closed. The County Court Judge warned that 
this practice should not be continued. 
* * * * * 
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CIWlTEll OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
STATD'l'Ol.Y PUSUHPTIOB OF •CARE Olt COli'l'ROL 
SEClIOB 237(l)(a) C.C. 
PUSUHPTIOB OF I.RBOCEBCE 
Whyte v. Regina County Court of Vancouver, April 1983 No. CC821405 
Vancouver Registry 
Applying section 237(l)(a) of the Criminal Code the trial judge had 
found that the accused, whose ability to drive was impaired, had care 
or control of his car. 
The accused appealed his conviction claiming that s. 237(l)(a) C.C. is 
a presumption of guilt which violates section 7 and section ll(d) of 
the Charter. The former guarantees no deprivation of liberty except 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice and the 
latter assures that we will be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
Reviewing cases* by courts of superior jurisdiction in other 
provinces, the County Court Judge held that the presumption of "care 
or control" does not violate the Charter. 
The superior courts have said that Parliament had not enacted the 
Charter in a vacuum and was aware of the established fair, efficient 
and reasonable system of criminal law in existence at that time. It 
did not intend to displace this but simply wanted to establish some 
new rights, modify others and give a clearer definition of them. 
"It cannot be thought that the intent of the provisions 
of the Charter that are in issue in this case, is to 
undermine and bring to the ground the whole framework of 
laws and the legal system of the country at the stroke of 
a pen, even if it be a royal pen". 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Belton (1983) 2 W.W.R. 472. (Manitoba Court of Appeal) 
R. v. Potha (1982) 37 O.R. (2d) 189 (Ontario High Court of Justice) 
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CARELESS STOIUBG OF FIJlEAKK 
Regina v. Batalka 70b c.c.c. (2d) 190 (1982) 
B. C. Court of Appeal 
The accused had an unloaded shotgun stared on a rack in the back 
window of his pick-up truck. Shells for the gun were stored on top of 
the dashboard. The accused left his truck parked on a public parking 
lot (reasons for Judgement do not say if it was locked) and was, as a 
consequence, convicted of "storing a firearm and ammunition in a care-
less manner". (s. 84(2) c.c.). He appealed his conviction. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal remarked that the Criminal Code usually 
prohibits things to be done in a "dangerous" manner or prohibits 
"criminal negligence" for certain activities or with certain conse-
quences. Seldom or not anywhere does it use the word "careless" to 
indicate a degree of negligence. Negligence is divided in civil as 
well as criminal law in categories and doing something without care is 
the lowest degree of negligence, usually left to be used in Provincial 
statutes. "Dangerous" and "criminal negligence" usually require 
advertence as a prerequisite to conviction. In other words the act 
must have been heedfully rather than inadvertently committed. The 
accused argued that the same applied when "carelessness" is an ingre-
dient to a Criminal Code of fence. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that the word "careless" must be given 
its ordinary plain meaning. It simply means doing something without 
care. Said the Court of Appeal: 
" ••• to protect the public from the improper carry-
ing, handling, shipping and storing of firearms, 
Parliament has imposed a duty of care. If the 
accused failed in this duty, he is liable, because 
the Code says so, even if he is no more than civilly 
or inadvertently liable". 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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LOITEKING - PROSTITUTION 
Regina v. Munroe - 1 c.c.c. {3d) 305 
County Court - Ontario 
The accused was observed for approximately 15 minutes, standing and 
walking back and forth near the entrance of a pedestrian tunnel. She 
accosted three men {separately) and had brief conversations with 
them. A fourth man she grabbed by the wrist and "steered him into the 
tunnel". At this stage police interfered which upset the accused who 
said: "I had the guy all lined up". She was consequently convicted 
under the provision of section 17l{l){c) c.c. which states: 
"Everyone who loiters in a public place and in any way 
obstructs persons who are there, is guilty of an offence 
punishable on summary conviction". 
She appealed that conviction claiming that she did not loiter or 
obstruct anyone. 
Loitering, the County Court Judge found, contains an element of 
"sauntering or idleness". He said that though many may disapprove of 
her objectives, the accused was far from idle but in pursuit of a 
purposeful activity. 
Furthermore the Judge thought that she had not obstructed anyone as 
was intended to be prohibited in the Criminal Code. Speaking of her 
"contacts" the Court said: 
• the trial judge erred in finding that the appel-
lant bad obstructed the male persons whom she approached 
including the four th male person the appellant took by 
the arm. If that person had resisted the appellant's 
aggressive approach and had she still persisted further, 
my conclusion might well have been different". 
The Court also commented that the section had been used in this case 
for purposes other than those for which it was designed. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Verdict of not guilty entered. 
* * * * * 
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REASOKABLE llOTICE THAT GUATEll PERAi.TY IS SOUGHT 
Regina v. Duncan 1 c.c.c. (3d) 444 
B. C. Court of Appeal 
In 1971 this court of Appeal held* that when a notice is served on an 
accused that the Crown intends to seek a greater penalty where the law 
provides for such a more severe penalty due to a previous conviction, 
(s. 740(1) C.C.) that notice cannot be served until the information is 
sworn and the notice must refer specifically to the charge upon which 
the greater penalty is sought. One justice of the Court of Appeal 
dissented 
Recently in this Duncan case, the same question arose and the B. C. 
Court of Appeal held unanimously that it had been in error in 1971. 
It held that the notice does not have to refer to the specific charge 
upon which the greater penalty is sought and the notice can be served 
prior to the information having been sworn. · 
Matter referred back to Provincial 
Court for sentencing. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Basi (1971) 5 c.c.c. (2d) 429 
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DEKARD M&DE CB PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AllALYSIS ILLEGALLY OBTAIHED EVIDEBCE? 
Regina v. Meadows County Court of Yale Kelowna Registry CR 5/83, 
April 1983 
A patrolling police officer received a complaint that involved a 11Dtor 
vehicle. The officer found the vehicle, followed it for some distance 
and found nothing out of the ordinary in the way it was being driven. 
To attend to the complaint the officer attempted to stop the vehicle. 
Shortly after the officer activiated his emergency lights, the 
accused (who drove the car under investigation) swung into the drive-
way of his home. During the conversation with the accused regarding 
the complaint the accused asked the officer if he had a warrant and 
questioned his right to be on the accused's private property. The 
officer noticed pronounced symptoms of impairment and attempted to 
read .the demand to the accused who had turned quite belligerent. The 
accused was arrested for impaired driving and analysis of breath 
resulted in a reading of 150 ml. The accused appealed his conviction 
of "over 80 ml.". 
The defence claimed that the evidence of blood-alcohol content was 
illegally obtained and was, as a consequence, inadmissible. Should 
the Court hold that the evidence is admissible the accused claimed 
that, due to the reading of s. 237 c.c., the evidence would not have 
any evidentiary value and that the presumption that his blood-alcohol 
content at the time of the test and driving were the same, could not 
be applied. 
The accused claimed that his arrest was unlawful as the officer, prior 
to the accused entering his driveway, had no evidence of impaired 
driving. It was after he trespassed that the officer obtained the 
grounds to believe that the accused was impaired 
The Courts have held that even where an officer in the strict sense is 
within the general scope of his duty, an unjustifiable use of power 
associated with that duty may well be an unlawful interference with a 
person's liberty. 
The court responded that the officer was entitled to follow the 
accused onto his property to investigate the complaint (which appar-
ently was unrelated to the charge) in relation to which the descrip-
tion of the accused's car was given to the officer. Once on the 
property the officer became aware of the impaired driving which did 
not, in the circumstances, become inadmissible because the accused 
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revoked the permission the officer may have had to enter on to the 
property. Said the Court: 
"I find, therefore, that not withstanding that the 
officer did not have before he entered on to the appel-
lant's property sufficient evidence on which to arrest 
him for impaired driving, that the evidence he obtained 
on the property was lawfully obtained, admissible against 
the appellant, and was important here, formed a basis for 
a lawful arrest for impaired driving." 
Hence the demand was lawful and the evidence that resulted from it was 
properly admitted in evidence. Consequently the Crown had the benefit 
of the presumption that the blood-alcohol level at the time of analy-
sis was the same as at the time of driving. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMEBT 
ACCUSED CLADIS BK WILL ll>T AlfSVEJt ~STIOllS URTIL BK ll&D 
TAJ.RD TO LAVYEK BOT COR'l'DmES TO ARSVER. QUESTIONS 
Regina v. Spearman 70 C.C.C. (2d) 371 (1982) 
B. C. Court of Appeal 
The accused confessed to a member of the John Howard Society that he 
murdered a woman. The member took him to the police where he was 
questioned for 1 1/2 hours. At the outset, when warned, the accused 
said he wanted to speak to a lawyer before he answered any questions. 
Despite this request, police questioned him and the accused answered 
the questions. At the conclusion of the interview the accused was 
asked to check for accuracy the notes made of the interview and sign 
them. The accused did the former and did agree with the content but 
refused to do the latter until he had consulted a lawyer. 
In the statement he confessed to strangling the woman. At trial the 
confession was admitted. The accused appealed his conviction of 
murder (second degree) claiming that the statement should not have 
been admitted. Although no threats were used the police had applied 
"subtle pressures" to keep him talking without consulting counsel. 
The Court of Appeal made some observations about the facts. The 
accused had mentioned several times, even during the interview that he 
wanted to see a lawyer first. Yet he continued to talk to police. He 
said he had done so out of fear that they would become angry and frus-
trated with his vague answers. Police said that they had not obtained 
counsel for the accused as they did not feel obligated to do so. The 
Court observed that the accused is a man with a criminal record who is 
accustomed to be questioned by police. He had made his own presenta-
tion to the Court of Appeal and the Justices were not inclined to 
believe that the accused was easily intimidated. 
The Court decided that the statements were voluntarily made and admis-
sible. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
Comment: It should be kept in mind that the interviews with the 
accused took place in 1980, well before the Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms became effective. The informing of a detained person of his 
right to counsel is not retroactively applied. Some predict that 
circumstances like these would receive different consideration by the 
Courts in view of the Charter. This seems debatable. Assuming an 
accused is made aware of his rights and says he wants to exercise them 
but continues to answer questions• then, if that questioning or any-
thing else is not the cause of the deprivation of that right. the 
outcome of a voir dire on this issue may well be similar to that in 
this Spearman -ca&e-.--Again. the Court apparently . placed a lot of 
emphasis on the fact that the accused was sophisticated in this area 
and not easily intimidated. A meek person in these circumstances, who 
continues to answer because he feels obliged to do so on account of 
continued questioning may well be considered to have been deprived of 
his right to instruct and retain counsel without delay. It should be 
remembered that the right to counsel was guaranteed under the Bill of 
Rights and existed at common law long before the Charter became effec-
tive. What is new is that an arrested or detained person must be 
informed of that age-old right. 
* * * * * 
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WITHHOLDING IDERTITY OF POLICE INFORMER -
TRAFFICll!fG BY AIDING PURCHASER. OF D:RIJG? 
Regina v. Davies 1 c.c.c. (3d) 299 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
A police informer contacted the accused and requested him to find a 
source of supply for cocaine and was promised money for his services. 
After some months the accused contacted the informer and told him he 
had a possible supplier. The informer introduced the accused to an 
under cover police officer as the prospective purchaser. Meetings and 
exchanges took place which resulted in a delivery of cocaine to the 
officer. It is conceded by all concerned that the accused did not 
handle any of the drugs or money in the transactions. He, however, 
was paid "a pittance" for his service. A jury convicted the accused 
of trafficking and he appealed. 
The issue, according to the defence, was its inability to present a 
full defence. The law is that if one only has aided the vendor by 
solely acting for the purchaser, he is not a trafficker. The accused 
claimed that he was solely acting on behalf of the informer and the 
officer. The informer who was the only person who dealt with the 
accused through all the events that made up the case against the 
accused, was not made available by the Crown during the trial. The 
defence applied unsuccessfully to the Court for the name and the last 
known whereabouts of the informer. 
The jury had been instructed that they had to find that the accused 
was an agent for the vendor to convict him. The Crown urged that the 
accused was "working both ends" and the defence claimed he was solely 
acting for the purchaser, the only one who paid him for his involve-
ment in the transactions. The informer, besides the accused, was the 
only person who could attest to this. The accused testified and to no 
avail applied to the Court to have the informer subpoenaed to corro-
borate his testimony. 
The Crown took the position that public interest demanded that the 
identity of police informers not be revealed and based its argument on 
an abundance of case-law that recognizes that the state cannot func-
tion and control criminal or other unlawful activities unless it can 
receive information from citizens without having to divulge its source 
to the public or the Courts. However, that is not the case if the 
informer is an agent provocateur. For instance, if a person, whether 
requested to do so by authorities or not, infiltrates certain circles 
and informs on the activites, he is solely an informer. However, if 
overt acts on his part manipulate, influence or direct the activities 
on behalf of the state, then he is an agent provocateur and his anony-
mity cannot always be preserved. 
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Here the informer did not simply introduce the officer to the 
accused. On general instructions he posed as an agent for the pur-
chasers of a large quantity of cocaine. 
"Once an agent provocateur goes into the field, he loses 
the protection of his cover". 
This, the Ontario Court of Appeal held, was particularly so when his 
testimony is required "to show the innocence of an accused". 
The informer was the only witness who could corroborate the accused's 
claim that any vendors he introduced to the informer or the officer 
had to make their own deals with them and that the single involvement 
on the part of the accused in the entire transaction was that intro-
duction. 
If the Crown, in circumstances as these, wishes to proceed, then for 
the sake of fairness it cannot leave the entire case on the credibil-
ity of the accused, but has to reveal the identity of the informer. 
After all, if the accused had been believed by the jury or even had 
created a reasonable doubt, then, if they were properly instructed, 
the verdict would have been different. Obviously they did not believe 
him, but would that also have been the case had his evidence been 
corroborated? 
Appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
Note: On the surface it appears that this decision flies in the face 
of that of the Supreme Court of Canada in Amato v. The Queen*. On 
closer examination it does not. One of the issues in that case (the 
main one was entrapment) was that the agent provocateur was not avail-
able to the Crown or the defence. The defence claimed that its 
inability to cross-examine deprived them of the ability to a full 
defence. However, the defence flag failed to fly. In view of the 
absence of that evidence, the trial judge "assumed that the findings 
of fact ought to be made on the basis of the evidence by the 
defence". In other words, he accepted the facts as the defence 
claimed they were. This meant that there were no adverse consequences 
to Amato as a result of the agent provocateur not being available. 
* * * * * 
